Resource nationalism isn’t coming. It’s already here.
China restricted rare earth exports in December 2024. The DRC banned cobalt exports in February 2025. Indonesia doubled nickel royalties. Tanzania revoked mining licenses. If you’re waiting for a clear signal to stress-test your project economics against sovereign risk, you’re about 18 months too late.
2026 marks the inflection point where critical mineral demand collides with populist fiscal policy. Governments holding copper, lithium, and gold reserves are watching Western nations and tech giants scramble for supply while their own citizens demand a bigger slice of the resource pie. That gap between geopolitical necessity and domestic political pressure creates exactly one outcome: tax increases, export restrictions, and forced local content requirements.
The question isn’t whether resource nationalism accelerates in 2026. The question is which jurisdictions hit first and how hard.
Why 2026 Is Different
The copper deficit alone tells the story. We’re tracking an 800,000-tonne supply gap this year, driven by AI data centers, EV production ramp-ups, and grid electrification projects that can’t be deferred. Copper demand is structural, not cyclical. That fundamentally changes the power dynamic between mining companies and host governments.
Add lithium into the mix. Battery production capacity doubled between 2023 and 2025, but primary lithium supply grew less than 30%. Gold isn’t immune either: central bank buying hit record levels in 2025 as reserve diversification accelerated.
Governments know this. They’re watching commodity price forecasts, tracking Western supply-chain anxiety, and calculating how much fiscal leverage they have before capital flight becomes a real threat. That calculation is shifting fast.
The 10 Jurisdictions to Watch
Not all resource nationalism looks the same. Export bans, windfall taxes, domestic processing mandates, and forced local equity stakes each carry different risk profiles. Here’s the breakdown of the ten jurisdictions where your project economics could face material headwinds in 2026.
Tier 1: Lower Risk, High Strategic Value
Argentina
Current policy: 5% mining royalty cap, stable foreign investment framework.
2026 risk: Moderate. Provincial governments have autonomy over royalty rates. Lithium Triangle provinces (Salta, Jujuy, Catamarca) may push for higher rates as global demand tightens. Watch for provincial-level policy shifts, not federal changes.
Chile
Current policy: Progressive mining royalty structure introduced in 2023 (up to 1% additional charge on operating margins above certain thresholds).
2026 risk: Moderate to high. New constitutional process ongoing. Lithium nationalization remains on the table under state-controlled Codelco expansion plans. Copper projects face less immediate risk than lithium, but any government change post-2025 elections could accelerate tax reform.
Peru
Current policy: 3% royalty on gross revenue for large-scale mining.
2026 risk: Moderate. Social conflict around mine sites creates pressure for higher local revenue sharing. Indigenous consultation requirements lengthening permitting timelines. Tax increases more likely at regional level than federal.
Brazil
Current policy: Compensation Financial for Mineral Exploration (CFEM) rates vary by commodity (0.2%–3.5%).
2026 risk: Low to moderate. Political stability improves project risk, but environmental enforcement in the Amazon tightens. Rare earth and critical mineral projects face pressure for domestic processing requirements.
Tier 2: Elevated Risk, Regulatory Uncertainty
India
Current policy: State ownership requirements for rare earth elements. Export controls on critical minerals.
2026 risk: High. Domestic value-addition mandates expanding. Rare earth projects face strict export licensing. Government prioritizing strategic autonomy over foreign investment in critical minerals. Gold mining more stable, but still subject to complex federal-state royalty splits.
Philippines
Current policy: 5% gross revenue tax plus 2% excise tax on minerals.
2026 risk: Moderate to high. Environmental permitting remains unpredictable. Nickel projects face enhanced scrutiny. Presidential administrations have historically oscillated between pro-mining and restrictive stances. 2026 may see increased local government revenue demands.
Madagascar
Current policy: 2% ad valorem royalty.
2026 risk: High. Political instability creates unpredictable policy environment. Large-scale nickel and rare earth deposits attract geopolitical attention. Weak institutions increase risk of sudden policy shifts or contract renegotiations.
Tier 3: High Risk, Active Resource Nationalism
Indonesia
Current policy: Export bans on unprocessed nickel ore (since 2020). Domestic processing requirements.
2026 risk: Very high. Government already demonstrated willingness to restrict exports. Royalty increases likely as global nickel prices recover. Forced divestment requirements for foreign miners remain in place. Any new project must include downstream processing or face export restrictions.
Tanzania
Current policy: 16% royalty on gross revenue for metallic minerals, plus additional charges.
2026 risk: Very high. History of contract renegotiations and sudden tax increases. 2017 legislation imposed harsh penalties on companies accused of underreporting. Gold projects particularly vulnerable. Government maintains right to acquire equity stakes in mining projects.
Democratic Republic of Congo
Current policy: 10% royalty on cobalt, 3.5% on copper. Export ban on cobalt concentrate implemented February 2025.
2026 risk: Extremely high. Export restrictions expanding. Resource nationalism actions already underway. Forced local processing requirements coming for copper. Political instability in eastern provinces threatens project continuity. Artisanal mining sector creates regulatory complexity.
The Risk Assessment Framework
Three variables drive resource nationalism intensity: commodity criticality, price trajectory, and domestic political pressure.
Commodity criticality: Lithium, cobalt, rare earths face higher risk than bulk commodities. Governments view these as strategic assets, not just revenue sources.
Price trajectory: Rising prices invite taxation. Falling prices don’t reduce risk: they trigger forced renegotiations and equity demands as governments try to maintain revenue.
Domestic political pressure: Election cycles, social movements, and inequality metrics all correlate with resource nationalism actions. A government facing domestic unrest needs quick revenue wins. Mining companies become the easiest target.
Here’s the matrix that matters:
| Jurisdiction | Commodity Risk | Policy Stability | 2026 Probability of Tax/Royalty Increase |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argentina | High (lithium) | Moderate | 45% |
| Brazil | Moderate | High | 25% |
| Chile | High (lithium/copper) | Moderate | 55% |
| Peru | Moderate (copper/gold) | Moderate | 40% |
| India | Very High (rare earths) | Moderate | 70% |
| Philippines | Moderate (nickel/gold) | Low | 50% |
| Madagascar | High (nickel/rare earths) | Very Low | 60% |
| Indonesia | Very High (nickel) | Low | 80% |
| Tanzania | High (gold) | Low | 75% |
| DR Congo | Very High (cobalt/copper) | Very Low | 85% |
What This Means for Your Project Economics
Run the numbers again. That’s not optional.
If your NPV model assumes stable fiscal terms through 2030, you’re pricing the project like it’s 2018. It’s not. Sensitivity analysis now requires scenarios for 5%, 10%, and 15% royalty increases, plus export restrictions that force domestic processing at margin-crushing costs.
Here’s the uncomfortable part: hedging resource nationalism risk isn’t about political risk insurance or local content theatrics. It’s about fundamentally rethinking where you deploy capital and what returns you can realistically expect.
Lower-risk jurisdictions like Brazil and Argentina still offer pathways to attractive returns, but they demand higher upfront community investment and provincial government engagement. Peru and Chile require sophisticated social license strategies that go beyond compliance.
Higher-risk jurisdictions like Indonesia, Tanzania, and the DRC? The math only works if you’re pricing in forced divestment, processing mandates, and royalty increases from day one. If you’re not, you’re underwriting optimism, not a mining project.
The Jurisdictional Arbitrage Game
Some mining majors are already repositioning. BHP shifted M&A focus toward stable jurisdictions rather than chasing the highest-grade deposits in high-risk countries. Rio Tinto absorbed massive writedowns in Mongolia rather than fight host government equity demands. Glencore continues operating in the DRC, but only because they priced in political risk at levels that would terrify most investors.
That’s the new normal. You either accept lower returns in stable jurisdictions or accept higher risk in high-grade jurisdictions. There’s no middle ground left.
Mid-tier miners face the hardest choices. They lack the balance sheet to absorb sudden tax increases or the political capital to negotiate special treatment. Junior explorers in high-risk jurisdictions are essentially writing call options on political stability: hoping to prove resources and flip the project before resource nationalism hits. That works until it doesn’t.
The 2026 Watchlist: Action Items
Stop treating resource nationalism as a tail risk. It’s a base case.
Stress-test every project against 10% royalty increases and export restrictions. If the project still generates acceptable returns under those conditions, proceed. If it doesn’t, walk away or restructure the deal to include local processing from the start.
Engage provincial governments early, not just federal ministries. Resource nationalism increasingly happens at the sub-national level where political pressure hits first.
Build social license strategies into project design, not as afterthoughts. Community opposition gives governments political cover for tax increases and contract renegotiations.
Track election cycles and commodity price movements simultaneously. The combination of rising prices and upcoming elections creates the perfect conditions for resource nationalism actions.
And finally: accept that the era of stable fiscal terms for critical mineral projects is over. Governments learned from past commodity cycles. They’re not waiting until prices peak to demand a larger share. They’re acting preemptively, and 2026 is when that strategy accelerates across all ten of these jurisdictions.
The jurisdictions on this watchlist aren’t theoretical risks. They’re active policy environments where your project economics can change overnight. Price that in now, or price it in later when it’s too late to adjust.
