Copper and cobalt processing infrastructure at a large mining complex in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
By Charles Pitts
The Democratic Republic of Congo has banned exports of copper and cobalt concentrates, tightening a long-running policy aimed at moving more mineral processing inside the country and retaining a larger share of mining value domestically.
The order, signed on June 29 by the ministers responsible for mines, foreign trade and the economy, took effect on Aug. 6, according to the government measure reported by Reuters.
It repeals earlier concentrate-export exemptions but gives the mines minister authority to issue strategic waivers lasting up to one year. The order also establishes a new tax regime for strategic mining byproducts, including a 55% valuation coefficient and a three-month transition period.
The immediate market question is not whether the DRC will export copper and cobalt in any form. The ban is narrower than that. It targets concentrates, while refined copper cathode, copper anode or blister and cobalt hydroxide fall under different product classifications and regulatory arrangements.
That distinction leaves China Molybdenum, or CMOC, less exposed than some other large producers. Glencore and Ivanhoe Mines, however, face direct regulatory exposure because of their DRC operations and previous reliance on concentrate-export derogations.
What the DRC order changes
The order prohibits the export of copper and cobalt concentrates from the DRC and replaces the previous framework under which producers could obtain exemptions for shipments that could not be processed domestically.
The government’s policy objective is to encourage local beneficiation. Concentrates contain valuable metal but require further treatment in smelters and refineries, many of which are located outside the DRC. By restricting concentrate exports, Kinshasa is seeking to increase domestic processing, expand industrial capacity and capture more fiscal and economic value before material leaves the country.
The new framework includes three important provisions:
| Provision | Practical effect |
|---|---|
| Concentrate-export ban | Copper and cobalt concentrates cannot be exported under ordinary exemptions |
| Strategic waiver | The mines minister may grant a one-year waiver in strategic, technical or economic circumstances |
| Byproduct tax regime | Strategic byproducts are subject to a 55% valuation coefficient after a three-month transition |
The waiver provision means the ban is not an absolute prohibition in every circumstance. It gives the government discretion to approve shipments where domestic processing is unavailable, technically unsuitable or considered strategically necessary.
For mining companies, that creates a compliance issue as well as a logistical one. Producers will need to demonstrate the form of the material being exported, the availability of domestic processing and the basis for any request to continue shipments.
The order also repeals previous exemptions, raising the possibility that companies operating under older derogations will need to apply again under the new rules.
Glencore faces the clearest operating pressure
Glencore’s DRC exposure is centred on Kamoto Copper Company, or KCC, and the Mutanda copper and cobalt operation. Both assets are strategically important to the company’s copper and cobalt portfolio, and changes to the treatment of intermediate products could affect logistics, inventories and processing economics.
The impact will depend on the product mix leaving each operation. Material that qualifies as concentrate will require domestic processing or a new strategic waiver. Material that has already been converted into a permitted processed product would not be covered by the concentrate ban itself, although other cobalt export controls remain relevant.
Glencore’s DRC operations are already operating against a separate cobalt-export quota regime. The company has previously said that cobalt produced above its permitted export allocation could be stored in the country and sold later as market and regulatory conditions allow.
That existing stockpiling framework may give Glencore some flexibility, but it does not remove the need to manage copper concentrate flows. The company may need to redirect material to domestic smelters, adjust production and blending schedules, or seek one-year waivers while additional processing capacity is developed.
The combination of the concentrate ban and cobalt quotas also increases the value of operational flexibility. Producers with access to domestic smelting, stable power and reliable transport links should be better positioned than operations that depend on exporting intermediate products.
Ivanhoe’s exposure is significant, but current concentrate exports are limited
Ivanhoe Mines said in an Aug. 6 clarification that a ban on exporting unbeneficiated concentrate had been in place and enforced in the DRC for close to a decade.
Since production began at the Kamoa-Kakula copper complex in 2021, the company received multiple derogations allowing copper concentrate exports. Ivanhoe said current Kamoa-Kakula concentrate is processed at the complex’s on-site smelter or at the Lualaba Copper Smelter in Kolwezi.
That means the new order does not necessarily imply an immediate halt to Kamoa-Kakula production or exports. The operation has been shifting toward domestic smelting, with copper leaving the country in more processed forms such as anode or blister rather than concentrate.
The distinction matters because Kamoa-Kakula’s domestic processing capacity reduces its dependence on export waivers. It also illustrates the direction of DRC policy: companies that can process material locally are likely to face fewer disruptions than those still reliant on offshore smelters.
Ivanhoe also said its Kipushi zinc operation has a derogation allowing the export of zinc concentrates. The new order specifically concerns copper and cobalt concentrates, so the treatment of zinc falls outside the measure described here.
Industrial smelting infrastructure supporting domestic copper processing in the DRC.
CMOC is largely outside the ban’s direct scope
CMOC’s two main DRC operations, Tenke Fungurume Mining and Kisanfu, produce copper cathode and cobalt hydroxide rather than copper and cobalt concentrates, according to market reporting and company-related commentary.
That product mix means CMOC’s Congolese operations are not directly affected by the new concentrate-export prohibition. The company’s integrated mining, processing and hydrometallurgical facilities already convert ore into more advanced products before export.
Copper cathode is a refined product. Cobalt hydroxide is an intermediate cobalt product, but it is not the same product category as cobalt concentrate targeted by the new order.
Cobalt hydroxide handling represents a different export stream from cobalt concentrates.
CMOC will still need to comply with the DRC’s broader licensing, tax and cobalt-export rules. But compared with concentrate producers, it does not face the same immediate requirement to secure a waiver or find a new route for material that would otherwise be shipped as concentrate.
The distinction may also increase the competitive importance of integrated DRC processing. Producers with cathode and hydroxide output can continue serving international customers while concentrate-dependent operations face additional administrative and logistical costs.
Global concentrate supply could tighten
The DRC is one of the world’s most important sources of copper and cobalt. A measure that restricts concentrate exports does not automatically remove contained metal from global markets, but it can change where and how that metal is processed.
The immediate effect is likely to be felt most strongly by overseas smelters that rely on DRC concentrate feed. If waivers are limited or delayed, available concentrate units could tighten even if refined copper production remains relatively stable.
That could affect treatment and refining charges, freight patterns and the availability of spot concentrate. It may also encourage buyers to compete more aggressively for material from other producing regions.
For cobalt, the impact is complicated by the existing quota system and by the fact that much of the DRC’s exportable cobalt moves as hydroxide rather than concentrate. The new order therefore needs to be read alongside the country’s separate cobalt policies rather than treated as a complete ban on cobalt exports.
The policy could support investment in DRC smelting and refining capacity, but infrastructure constraints remain material. Power reliability, transport, equipment availability and technical operating performance will determine how quickly producers can replace export routes with domestic processing.
Covered storage and transport infrastructure used to move mineral products through the DRC supply chain.
What investors and operators will watch next
The next indicators will be administrative rather than purely market-based.
Companies will be watching for:
- The criteria for strategic waivers. The order gives the mines minister discretion, but the government has not publicly defined how applications will be assessed or prioritized.
- The classification of borderline products. Producers and customs authorities will need consistent rules distinguishing concentrates from hydroxide, anode, blister and other processed forms.
- Domestic smelter utilization. Higher local processing requirements will test available capacity, power supply and logistics.
- The implementation of the 55% coefficient. The three-month transition period should clarify how the new valuation base applies to strategic byproducts.
- Changes in concentrate availability and treatment charges. Overseas smelters may face tighter feed markets if waivers are not granted quickly.
The DRC’s move reinforces a broader trend among mineral-producing countries: export controls are increasingly being used to push miners up the value chain rather than simply increase royalty or tax rates.
For Glencore, the immediate challenge is managing concentrate exposure across a portfolio already affected by cobalt quotas. For Ivanhoe, the expansion of domestic smelting at Kamoa-Kakula provides a buffer, although the company remains directly exposed to the regulatory framework. For CMOC, its cathode and hydroxide production model leaves its DRC exports largely outside the new concentrate ban.
The central issue for global supply will be whether the DRC’s policy changes the location of processing or constrains the flow of metal altogether. In the short term, it is likely to do both at the margin: redirecting material toward domestic facilities while increasing uncertainty for companies and smelters that depend on concentrate exports.
For additional context, see Skillings’ analysis of the copper supply deficit and energy-transition demand and its copper price outlook.
