Nobody saw tungsten coming. Or more accurately, nobody wanted to see it coming.
BMO Capital Markets just published what amounts to a wake-up call for an industry that’s been operating on autopilot. The message is blunt: the world has “sleepwalked” into a tungsten supply crunch that’s already reshaping global manufacturing and defense supply chains. And unlike other commodity stories where you can substitute, delay, or engineer your way out of trouble, tungsten doesn’t offer those options.
The metal is irreplaceable in too many critical applications. Which makes the current supply shock not just inconvenient, but strategically dangerous.
The 5x Price Surge Nobody Planned For
Tungsten prices have quintupled since late 2024. That’s not a gradual climb or a speculative bubble. It’s a structural repricing driven by supply constraints colliding with demand that refuses to bend.
Ammonium paratungstate (APT), the primary tradable form of tungsten, crossed $480 per metric ton unit in early February 2026, up from roughly $95/mtu in Q4 2024. For context, that’s a steeper price acceleration than lithium saw at its peak, and tungsten doesn’t have the same visibility in commodity headlines.
Why the surge? Three converging factors:
Chinese export curbs. Beijing tightened APT export quotas in mid-2025, cutting available supply by approximately 30% year-over-year. China controls roughly 80% of global tungsten production and over 85% of APT refining capacity. When they throttle exports, global buyers don’t have meaningful alternatives.
Defense procurement acceleration. Tungsten is critical for armor-piercing ammunition, kinetic penetrators, and radiation shielding in defense applications. NATO countries ramped military production schedules in 2025, creating sustained demand spikes that civilian sectors can’t compete with on price.
Manufacturing inflexibility. Tungsten carbide tooling, high-temperature applications, and aerospace components don’t have viable substitutes at scale. You can’t swap tungsten out of a jet engine turbine blade or a drilling bit without fundamentally redesigning the product. That means demand is sticky even as prices spike.

The problem isn’t just that prices rose. It’s that industrial buyers are now competing with government procurement officers who have deeper pockets and strategic mandates. The rules changed, and most companies still haven’t adjusted their sourcing models.
China’s APT Export Curbs: Strategic Leverage in Action
Beijing’s export restrictions on APT aren’t new policy. They’re the latest iteration of a playbook China has been refining for over a decade with rare earths, gallium, and germanium.
In June 2025, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced revised export licensing requirements for tungsten products, specifically targeting APT. The stated rationale was environmental compliance and resource conservation. The practical effect was a hard cap on how much refined tungsten could leave Chinese borders.
The timing wasn’t coincidental. It came three months after the EU and U.S. announced joint critical minerals initiatives designed to reduce dependency on Chinese supply chains. China responded by reminding Western nations exactly how dependent they remain.
What makes the APT restrictions particularly effective is tungsten’s processing bottleneck. Mining tungsten concentrate is one thing. Converting it to APT requires specialized refining infrastructure that barely exists outside China. Several Western producers operate mines, but they’re mostly shipping concentrate to China for processing, then buying back the refined APT.
That’s not a supply chain. It’s a dependency loop.

The export curbs have created a two-tier pricing system. Domestic Chinese APT trades at government-influenced prices, while international spot markets reflect actual scarcity. The spread between the two reached $180/mtu in January 2026, creating arbitrage opportunities that exist only on paper because no one can physically move material across the border without licenses.
Why Tungsten Is Irreplaceable
Tungsten’s value proposition comes down to physics. It has the highest melting point of any pure metal (3,422°C), exceptional density (19.25 g/cm³), and maintains hardness at elevated temperatures better than virtually any alternative.
Those properties make it essential in applications where nothing else works:
Defense systems. Kinetic energy penetrators use tungsten alloys because density equals lethality. Depleted uranium offers similar performance, but tungsten avoids the regulatory and political complications. Military demand is non-discretionary and price-insensitive.
Industrial tooling. Tungsten carbide cutting tools dominate precision machining and drilling. Substitutes exist for low-stress applications, but high-performance manufacturing: aerospace, automotive, energy: requires tungsten carbide. The industry has spent decades optimizing processes around these tools. Switching materials means retooling entire production lines.
Electronics and lighting. Tungsten filaments, electrodes, and semiconductor applications rely on the metal’s electrical and thermal properties. While LED lighting reduced demand for tungsten filaments, semiconductor fab equipment and specialty electronics picked up the slack.
Oil and gas drilling. Downhole drilling tools use tungsten carbide inserts for their wear resistance. As drilling moves into harder formations and deeper wells, tungsten content per bit increases. There’s no economically viable substitute at depth.
The “irreplaceable” designation isn’t marketing. It’s materials science reality. Substitution research exists, but the timelines run 5–10 years to validate alternatives and retool manufacturing. The current supply crunch is happening now.
BMO’s Five Rebalancing Options
BMO’s analysis lays out five potential paths for the tungsten market to reach equilibrium. None of them are fast, and none avoid pain.
Option 1: Demand destruction through price rationing. Let prices rise until non-essential users exit the market. This is already happening in construction and consumer goods, where buyers can defer purchases or switch to lower-performance alternatives. But defense and critical manufacturing won’t stop buying, which limits how much demand destruction actually occurs.
Option 2: Accelerate non-Chinese production. Bring mothballed mines back online and fast-track development projects in Canada, Australia, and Europe. Technically feasible, but tungsten projects face 3–5 year lead times from restart decision to commercial production. And that assumes permitting doesn’t drag.
Option 3: Build Western refining capacity. Break China’s APT processing monopoly by constructing refineries in North America and Europe. This is the highest-impact option long-term, but also the most capital-intensive. A single APT refinery runs $200–300 million and takes 4–5 years to commission. No one has broken ground yet.
Option 4: Strategic stockpile releases. The U.S. National Defense Stockpile holds tungsten reserves that could theoretically cushion supply shortages. But releasing strategic materials for civilian use is politically complicated, and stockpile volumes aren’t large enough to move global prices meaningfully for more than a few quarters.
Option 5: Diplomatic negotiation with China. Attempt to negotiate export quota increases or establish long-term supply agreements that bypass the spot market. This requires treating tungsten as a diplomatic issue rather than a commercial one, which Western governments have been slow to do.

BMO’s assessment suggests the market will likely experience some combination of all five options, with price rationing and accelerated mine development doing most of the heavy lifting through 2028. The refining capacity question remains the long pole. Until Western buyers have processing alternatives, China retains structural leverage regardless of where the ore gets mined.
What the Sleepwalk Metaphor Actually Means
The “sleepwalk” framing from BMO isn’t just colorful language. It’s a specific critique of how industrial planners approached tungsten supply over the past decade.
While lithium, cobalt, and rare earths generated headlines and policy attention, tungsten flew under the radar despite having worse concentration risk and fewer active development projects. The metal wasn’t sexy enough for ESG investors, wasn’t large enough by volume to trigger commodity trader interest, and wasn’t volatile enough historically to seem risky.
So supply chain managers kept doing what they’d always done: ordering APT from established Chinese suppliers, assuming availability would continue indefinitely at predictable prices. They sleepwalked because nothing in the market structure forced them to wake up.
Until China tightened the screws. And defense demand surged. And prices quintupled.
The uncomfortable truth is that tungsten represents a category of critical minerals that exist outside the standard commodity risk frameworks. Too specialized for broad market attention, too concentrated to diversify easily, too embedded in manufacturing processes to substitute quickly. It’s the kind of exposure that only becomes visible when it breaks.
And now it’s broken.
The 2026 Reality Check
February 2026 marks an inflection point for tungsten markets. Prices have stabilized in the $460–490/mtu range after January’s spike, but that’s not equilibrium. It’s a pause while buyers digest the new cost structure and suppliers figure out how to respond.
The manufacturing impact is starting to show. Several European automotive tooling suppliers reported margin compression in Q4 2025 earnings calls, citing tungsten costs as a primary driver. U.S. defense contractors are lobbying for cost-plus contract modifications to account for tungsten price volatility. Chinese domestic manufacturers are gaining competitive advantage by accessing APT at lower administered prices.
The strategic implications run deeper than quarterly margins. Tungsten dependence is now a acknowledged national security vulnerability in the same category as rare earth magnets and semiconductor fabrication equipment. The difference is that tungsten got almost no policy attention until the supply crunch was already underway.
That policy lag matters. Even with accelerated timelines, meaningful supply diversification is 3–4 years away. Refining capacity is further out. The market has to navigate the gap with the infrastructure it has today, which means China maintains pricing power and allocation control through at least 2028.
Welcome to the post-sleepwalk world. Tungsten just became a strategic metal that requires the same level of supply chain attention as any other critical mineral dependency. The only question is whether Western governments and industrial buyers will move fast enough to matter, or whether they’ll keep hitting snooze until the next supply shock hits.
The alarm is ringing. Whether anyone actually wakes up remains to be seen.


