Chile is tired of playing second fiddle. For years, the narrative has been one of squandered potential: a country sitting on the world’s largest lithium reserves while watching Australia run away with the production crown. But today, March 1, 2026, the script is being rewritten in real-time.
The Chilean Mining Ministry is currently moving at a pace rarely seen in Santiago. With President Gabriel Boric’s term nearing its end, the administration is attempting a “midnight sprint” to finalize five major lithium contracts. The goal isn’t just to increase output; it’s an aggressive attempt to reclaim the top spot in the global supply chain before the political winds shift.
Here’s the reality: Chile currently holds 33.6% of global lithium reserves. Despite that geological stranglehold, they have lost market leadership. They are second. In the mining world, being the first loser on the production charts while holding the best assets is a bitter pill to swallow.
The Five-Contract Sprint: Ascotán to Agua Amarga
The Mining Ministry is submitting five new Special Lithium Operation Contracts (CEOLs) to the national comptroller this week. These aren’t minor exploratory permits. They represent a strategic move to unlock high-potential salt flats that have been tied up in bureaucratic red tape for years.
The list includes:
- Salar de Ascotán
- Quillagua Sur
- Hilaricos
- Salar de Piedra Parada
- Salar de Agua Amarga
Additionally, the government is pushing two direct-award contracts: Ollague and Laguna Verde: to bypass the standard bidding slog. This isn’t just about geology; it’s about legacy. The Boric administration wants these deals cemented before a new president takes office in March 2026. They are racing against the clock.

Reclaiming the Crown: The 430,000-Tonne Target
Manuel Viera, the outspoken head of the Chilean Mining Chamber, has been beating this drum for years. His message is blunt: Chile can reclaim the #1 producer status within a decade, but only if the government stops acting as a bottleneck.
The numbers are ambitious. The National Lithium Strategy aims to grow annual production from 280,000 tonnes in 2024 to approximately 430,000 tonnes by 2034. That is a 54% increase. It sounds impressive until you look at the competition. While Chile was debating state control, other jurisdictions were permitting.
“The geological advantage is ours,” Viera has noted. “The political disadvantage is also ours.”
For investors, the question isn’t whether the lithium is there: it is: but whether the copper forecast 2026 and general mining sentiment will favor Chile’s new hybrid state-private model.
The National Lithium Strategy: A State-Controlled Speed Trap?
The core tension in Chile remains the “National Lithium Strategy.” This is Boric’s signature policy, which mandates state control over “strategic” salt flats while allowing private participation in others.
In theory, it offers the best of both worlds: sovereign wealth and private efficiency. In practice, it has created a regulatory labyrinth. The recent blocking of the Quillagua Norte and Quillagua Este contracts by regulators due to “legal deficiencies” highlights the friction. Even when the government wants to move fast, the framework they built often trips them up.
| Project Phase | State Role (Codelco/ENAMI) | Private Role | Strategic Importance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Atacama (Nova Andino) | 50% + 1 Share | SQM (Operator) | High (World’s Largest) |
| Maricunga | Majority Owner | Rio Tinto (Partner) | High |
| New CEOLs (Ascotán, etc.) | Variable | Bidders/Partners | Medium-High |
This hybrid model is a gamble. It assumes that global majors like Rio Tinto or Eramet are willing to accept the role of junior partner in exchange for access to the highest-grade brine on the planet. For some, the trade-off is worth it. For others, it’s a non-starter.
The SQM-Codelco Marriage: Nova Andino Litio
The centerpiece of this entire strategy is the joint venture between state-owned Codelco and the private giant SQM. Rebranded as Nova Andino Litio, this partnership secures the Atacama salt flat: the crown jewel of global lithium: through 2060.
The deal structure is a masterclass in compromise. Until 2030, SQM runs the show while Codelco takes a majority of the dividends. From 2031 to 2060, Codelco takes operational control.
This deal didn’t happen in a vacuum. It required Chinese regulatory approval, which was finally granted in late 2025. This was a critical hurdle, given the M&A mania 2026 we’ve seen across the sector. Without Atacama, Chile’s lithium ambitions aren’t just delayed: they’re dead.
But here is the kicker: Presidential candidates are already pledging to “review” this deal once they take power. In Chile, “security of tenure” is becoming a relative term.

Rio Tinto and the Maricunga Play
While the SQM-Codelco deal grabs the headlines, the entry of Rio Tinto into the Maricunga project via a partnership with Codelco is arguably more significant for the industry’s long-term health.
Rio Tinto doesn’t do small. Their entry signals that despite the state-heavy rhetoric, the “Big Miners” still see Chile as the indispensable lithium hub. This follows the trend of majors securing future-facing commodities, much like BHP’s focus on its copper pipeline.
Rio Tinto brings something Codelco lacks in the lithium space: massive capital and Direct Lithium Extraction (DLE) technical expertise. If DLE can be successfully scaled at Maricunga, it could bypass the environmental concerns surrounding traditional evaporation ponds: concerns that have frequently stalled project approvals.
The ESG Hurdles: Beyond the Brine
You cannot talk about Chilean lithium without talking about water. The salt flats are located in the driest desert on earth. Local communities and environmental groups are not just stakeholders; they are roadblocks.
The government’s push to fast-track these five contracts must navigate a minefield of ESG reporting requirements. In 2026, you don’t just dig a hole; you justify its existence to every indigenous council and environmental regulator in the Atacama.
The administration’s rush to sign these deals is partly an attempt to “grandfather in” these projects before even stricter environmental standards are implemented by the next government. It’s a cynical move, perhaps, but one born of economic necessity.
Conclusion: A 2026 Inflection Point
Chile is at a crossroads. The next 180 days will determine if the country can truly pivot back to global dominance or if it will remain a cautionary tale of “what could have been.”
The submission of the Ascotán, Quillagua Sur, and Hilaricos contracts is a start. But as Manuel Viera points out, contracts are just paper. Production requires pipes, pumps, and political stability.
If these deals are finalized and the SQM-Codelco transition remains on track, Chile will likely hit its 430,000-tonne goal. That would be enough to challenge Australia. But if legal challenges continue to mount: like the ones that derailed Quillagua Norte: Chile will find itself with a lot of “strategic” lithium that remains exactly where it has been for millions of years: in the ground.
The race is on. The clock is ticking. And in Santiago, the lights at the Mining Ministry are staying on late into the night. They aren’t just trying to sign deals; they’re trying to save an industry.


