India was warming up to China while warning the world about the risks of depending on it.
That tension sat at the centre of Narendra Modi’s message at the BRICS summit in New Delhi. Speaking as India hosted leaders from the expanded bloc, the prime minister warned against the “weaponisation” of technology and critical minerals, saying such practices could obstruct shared progress.
The timing gave the remark extra weight. Modi had recently met Chinese President Xi Jinping as New Delhi and Beijing worked to stabilise relations after years of tension. His comments also came as Washington pushes to reduce its exposure to Chinese control over strategic supply chains.
For India, the issue is not simply whether to work with Washington or Beijing. It is how to build enough supply-chain flexibility that neither relationship becomes a strategic dependency.
China controls the bottleneck, not just the ore
Critical-mineral dependence is rarely just a question of where a country mines.
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The harder problem often sits further down the chain: separation, refining, metals, alloys, magnets and other processed products. China has built a formidable position across these stages.
The International Energy Agency estimates that China accounted for about 60% of global mined production of magnet rare earths in 2024. Its position becomes much stronger after mining: China accounted for about 91% of global refined output and 94% of sintered permanent magnet production.
That gives Beijing influence over industries that need reliable supplies of materials such as neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium.
The vulnerability became clearer when China introduced export controls on several critical minerals and rare earth products. The IEA said the measures showed how supply concentration can quickly become a real disruption for manufacturers outside China.
For India, that creates a difficult calculation.
India has resources. The gap is downstream.
India’s critical-minerals challenge is often described as a resource problem.
It is more accurately a value-chain problem.
The Indian government says the country has 767 million tonnes of cumulative rare earth element ore resources and already has capabilities in mining, separation and oxide refining. The weakness lies further downstream. India lacks sufficient industrial-scale capacity to turn those oxides into metals, alloys and finished permanent magnets, and currently imports its sintered NdFeB magnet requirements.
A deposit in the ground cannot power an electric motor or defence system by itself. Someone has to separate the material, refine it, manufacture the magnet and deliver a product that meets industrial specifications at a competitive cost.
India has started building a policy framework to close that gap.
The government approved a ₹7,280-crore scheme to establish 6,000 tonnes per year of integrated sintered rare earth permanent-magnet manufacturing capacity. The programme covers the chain from rare earth oxides through metals and alloys to finished magnets. The capacity is a policy target, not production already operating today.
India has also placed critical minerals at the centre of its wider National Critical Mineral Mission. The programme covers domestic exploration, overseas mineral assets, processing, recycling, technology and financing.
That combination matters because India cannot secure supply simply by finding more ore. It needs control over more of the chain that turns ore into industrial products.
What Washington hears
Washington has a clear reason to pay attention.
The United States is also trying to reduce exposure to China’s position in critical-mineral supply chains and build relationships with alternative suppliers. India can contribute because it has mineral resources, a large industrial base and growing demand for electric vehicles, electronics, renewable energy and defence equipment.
But India is unlikely to treat critical minerals as a simple US-China contest.
New Delhi wants access to Western capital and technology. It also wants stable economic relations with China and enough diplomatic flexibility to manage a difficult neighbour.
That makes diversification a more realistic Indian objective than outright decoupling.
For Washington, that distinction matters. India can cooperate on critical minerals without turning its entire mineral policy into an extension of US-China strategic competition.
What Beijing sees
The same policy looks different from Beijing.
Better India-China relations can support trade and regional stability. They do not, however, remove India’s concern about concentrated mineral supply chains.
The remarks can therefore be read as a message to Beijing: diplomatic engagement does not mean accepting permanent dependence on one supplier.
The broader BRICS position reinforces that interpretation. The New Delhi Declaration called for reliable, diversified and resilient critical-mineral supply chains while stressing value addition and the economic interests of resource-rich countries.
That language gives India room to pursue diversification without presenting the policy as an anti-China campaign.
India is building an option, not picking a side
This is where the critical-minerals story becomes more important than the speech itself.
India’s strategy is shifting from resource access towards supply-chain capability.
The country needs more domestic processing. It needs magnet manufacturing, recycling and technical expertise. It also needs overseas mining partnerships because no major economy can realistically produce every mineral it consumes.
That approach gives India something more useful than self-sufficiency: choice.
If Chinese supply remains available and competitive, Indian companies can use it. If geopolitical tensions disrupt that supply, India needs alternatives. If Australia, the United States, Japan or other partners offer competitive sources or technology, India needs the capacity to use those options too.
That is strategic autonomy in practical terms.
The real test comes after the warning
The next phase will show whether India can turn policy into industrial capacity.
First, watch downstream manufacturing. The ₹7,280-crore magnet programme needs companies to build plants, secure technology and produce at commercially viable costs.
Second, watch overseas supply. India will need partnerships that secure mineral feedstock beyond its borders.
Third, watch the India-US-China balance. Critical minerals will increasingly sit alongside semiconductors, defence technology and energy as areas where diplomatic choices have direct industrial consequences.
Modi’s warning at BRICS was therefore more than a comment on trade.
It highlighted a problem India cannot solve through diplomacy alone.
New Delhi wants better relations with Beijing without accepting mineral dependence. It wants closer cooperation with Washington without becoming part of a rigid anti-China supply chain. And it wants India itself to control more of the processing and manufacturing that turn mineral resources into strategic industrial capacity.
The mineral race is no longer just about who has the ore.
It is about who can process it, manufacture with it and keep alternative sources available when geopolitics gets in the way.
India is trying to build those options before it needs them.
