Brazil now has a national legal framework for critical and strategic minerals. Law 15.506, enacted on September 16, created the National Policy for Critical and Strategic Minerals (PNMCE) and the National Council for the Industrialization of Critical and Strategic Minerals (CIMCE). The law took effect on the day it was published.
The timing is significant.
Brazil is attracting international capital into rare earths and lithium while trying to build more processing capacity at home. At the same time, mining projects continue to face environmental, community and permitting challenges.
Three developments illustrate the situation: USA Rare Earth’s $2.8 billion acquisition of Serra Verde, the legal dispute surrounding Sigma Lithium’s Grota do Cirilo operation, and Brazilian Rare Earth’s work to develop rare-earth processing capacity at Camaçari.
These events are separate from the new law. Together, they show the opportunities and constraints that Brazil’s critical-minerals strategy must now address.
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What Law 15.506 Changes
Law 15.506 puts greater emphasis on beneficiation and mineral transformation rather than extraction alone.
The PNMCE covers mineral research, mining, beneficiation, transformation and urban mining. It also establishes the CIMCE as the body responsible for coordinating, planning and monitoring the policy.
The law also brings certain ownership and foreign-participation issues into the critical-minerals framework.
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It provides for government screening and approval of direct or indirect changes in corporate control involving companies that hold mining rights for critical or strategic minerals. The framework also covers significant foreign participation or influence in companies holding those rights, as well as certain international contracts and other transactions specified by the law.
That matters for mining finance.
Foreign investors can still enter Brazil’s critical-minerals sector, but future transactions involving strategic mineral assets will operate within a framework that gives the Brazilian government a formal screening role.
The law also creates financial support mechanisms.
Brazil is authorised to establish the Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund, or FGAM, with federal participation of up to R$2 billion. The fund is intended to provide guarantees for projects and activities linked to critical and strategic minerals.
The law also creates a framework for fiscal support for mineral beneficiation, transformation and urban mining. Between 2030 and 2034, qualifying tax credits can reach up to 20% of eligible spending, subject to regulations and fiscal limits. The overall ceiling is R$1 billion for each calendar year.
That benefit is not automatic. The government must establish the rules and determine the amount of credit available within the programme’s fiscal limits.
Serra Verde Shows the Capital Interest
USA Rare Earth’s acquisition of Serra Verde is a clear example of international interest in Brazil’s rare-earth resources.
The companies announced the $2.8 billion transaction in April, and USA Rare Earth completed the combination in September. Serra Verde’s Pela Ema operation in Goiás gives the combined company access to a rare-earth asset with heavy rare-earth content, while USA Rare Earth brings downstream processing and permanent-magnet capabilities.
The timing matters.
The transaction closed before Law 15.506 took effect. It therefore was not a transaction reviewed under the new critical-minerals law.
Its significance is different. The deal shows the type of international capital and vertically integrated business model that Brazil’s new policy will need to accommodate.
Brazil wants more value from its mineral resources. Investors are also looking for deposits that can feed processing and manufacturing chains.
Serra Verde sits directly at that intersection.
Sigma Lithium Shows the Other Side of the Equation
Brazil’s lithium sector presents a different challenge.
On September 4, a federal judge ordered the suspension of environmental licences and mining activities at Sigma Lithium’s Grota do Cirilo operation in Minas Gerais, according to Reuters reporting based on the court document. The case followed a lawsuit by the Federation of Quilombola Communities of Minas Gerais over the project’s potential impact on the Baú Quilombola community.
The judge found sufficient evidence that the Baú territory fell within the project’s area of influence. The ruling triggered requirements connected to consultation with the community.
Sigma disputed the effect of the preliminary ruling. The company said it had not received legal communication about the decision and stated that its operations remained unaffected.
The case is separate from Law 15.506.
It does, however, highlight a practical issue for Brazil’s critical-minerals strategy. A government can prioritise mining and offer financial support, but projects must still meet environmental and community requirements.
Camaçari Tests the Processing Ambition
Brazilian Rare Earths provides another part of the picture.
The company is developing a rare-earth processing operation at Camaçari in Bahia. Its pilot programme is designed to test the processing route needed to move Brazilian rare-earth material toward higher-value products.
That focus fits closely with the direction of Law 15.506.
The new policy prioritises beneficiation and mineral transformation. It also identifies materials suitable for producing permanent magnets for electric motors among the types of projects that can receive priority under the investment framework.
For Brazil, that distinction is important.
Mining creates the starting material. Processing and transformation determine how much of the downstream value remains inside the country.
The Test Is Whether Capital and Processing Can Move Together
Brazil’s new law combines incentives with greater government oversight.
On one side, the country is offering support for critical-minerals projects, including a potential R$2 billion guarantee fund and future tax credits for qualifying processing and transformation projects. On the other, the law introduces screening mechanisms for ownership changes and certain foreign participation and supply arrangements.
That balance will matter to investors.
Brazil needs foreign capital to develop mines and processing facilities. It also wants greater domestic value creation, stronger supply-chain control and more industrial capacity.
The next phase will show whether those objectives can work together.
Serra Verde demonstrates the scale of international capital interested in Brazilian rare earths. The Sigma dispute shows that lithium projects remain exposed to environmental and community-related legal risks. Camaçari points to the processing capacity Brazil wants to develop.
The new law brings those issues into a single national policy framework.
Brazil has the mineral resources, international investor interest and a new legal structure for critical minerals. The challenge now is execution: turning those advantages into projects that can secure capital, obtain the necessary approvals, build processing capacity and operate within Brazil’s environmental and community requirements.
